“But what does it talk about?”: An examination about whatever it is ethics based on his subject-matter
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15381/tesis.v14i19.21261Keywords:
ontology, meta-ontology, metaethics, subject-matter, naturalismAbstract
We assume that the question “what is ethics?” implies an ontological and metaontological research, fact which should lead us to an explanation and justification of the naturalistic research program. Under such framework, an ontological research should favorably proceed if it’s unrestricted and epistemically responsible with providing criteria. In such case, the ontology of something could be called a porttheory, which, in regard to ethics and this case, would be delimited to the examination of metaethical stances and to the definition of “ethics” by the definition of its subjectmatter. The examination will result in noting the apparent un-encompassing character of morality, which could lead to an abolitionism based on its conceptual fatigue. We object such abolitionism by affirming that the ampleness of what’s moral, in his metaethical presentation, calls for a better accordance with naturalism.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. (2000). Intention. (2.ª ed.). Harvard University Press.
Aristotle y Reeve, C. D. C. (2018). Physics. Hackett Publishing Company.
Bennett, C. (2015). What is this thing called ethics? In What is this thing called ethics? (Second). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203494189
Bloomfield, P. (2003). Moral Reality. En Moral Reality. https://doi.org/10.1093/0195137132.001.0001
Bykvist, K. y Olson, J. (2019). What matters in metaethics. Analysis (United Kingdom), 79(2), 341-349. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz010
Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic. The University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.1086/396597
Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. Revue Internationale de PhilosophiePhilosophie, 4(11), 20-40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23932367
Chrisman, M. (2019). What is a theory of normative concepts for? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 86, 63-85. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1358246119000079
Clarke-Doane, J. (2020). The ethics-mathematics analogy. Philosophy Compass, 15(1), 9-10. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12641
Dancy, J. (1993). Moral reasons. Blackwell. de Maagt, S. (2017). Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity. Inquiry (United Kingdom), 60(5), 443-465. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1175377
Devall, B. y Sessions, G. (1985). Deep ecology. Peregrine Smith Books. https://doi.org/10.19141/1809-2454.kerygma.v15.n2.p50-63
Dockstader, J. (2019). Nonassertive Moral Abolitionism. Metaphilosophy, 50(4), 481-502. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12368
Doris, J. M. y Stich, S. P. (2007). As a matter of fact: Empirical perspectives on ethics. En F. Jackson y M. Smith (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234769.003.0005
Engel, M. (2012). Coherentism and the epistemic justification of moral beliefs: A case study in how to do practical ethics without appeal to a moral theory. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50(1), 50-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00084.x
Enoch, D. (2018). Non-naturalistic realism in metaethics. En T. McPherson y D. Plunkett (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (pp. 29-42). Routledge.
Fairweather, A. (2001). Epistemic motivation. En A. Fairweather y L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Virtue epistemology: Essays on epistemic virtue and responsibility (pp. 63-81). Oxford University Press.
Garner, R. y Joyce, R. (Eds.). (2019). The end of morality. Taking moral abolitionism seriously (Vol. 148). Routledge.
Hieronymi, P. (2008). Responsibility for believing. Synthese, 161(3), 357-373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9089-x
Hinckfuss, I. (2019). To hell with morality. In R. Garner y R. Joyce (Eds.), The end of morality. Taking moral abolitionism seriously (pp. 21-38). Routledge.
Hofweber, T. (2017). Logic and ontology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/
Jonas, S. (2020). Mathematical and moral disagreement. Philosophical Quarterly, 70(279), 302-327. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz057
Joyce, R. (2003). The myth of morality. Cambridge University Press.
Laskowski, N. (2018). Epistemic modesty in ethics. Philosophical Studies, 175(7), 1577-1596. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0924-3
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell.
Lindley, D. (1993). The end of physics. The myth of a unified theory. Basic Books: Haper Collins.
Mackie, J. (1977). Ethics. Inventing right and wrong. Penguin Books. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184791
Margolis, E. y Laurence, S. (1999). Concepts. Core Readings. MIT Press.
Margolis, E. y Laurence, S. (2015). The conceptual mind: New directions in the study of concepts. In The conceptual mind. New directions in the study of concepts. The MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.193092
Miller, L. F. (2018). How ecology can edify ethics: The scope of morality. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 31(4), 443-454. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9738-3
Moore, G. E. (1993). Principia ethica. Revised edition. With the preface to the second edition and other papers (T. Baldwin [Ed.]). Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, G. (2018). The Big Book of Concepts. In The big book of concepts. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1602.001.0001
Nietzsche, F. (2007). On the genealogy of morality (K. Ansell-Pearson [Ed.], translated). Cambridge University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011a). On what matters. Volume one. Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011b). On what matters: Volume two. Oxford University Press.
Parker, M. (2009). Two concepts of empirical ethics. Bioethics, 23(4), 202-213. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8519.2009.01708.x
Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dicothomy. In The collapse of the fact/value dicothomy and other essays including the Rosenthal Lectures (pp. 7-64). Cambridge University Press.
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. The Philosophical Review1, 60(1), 20-43. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvcm4fzv.17
Railton, P. (2018). Naturalistic realism in metaethics. In The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (pp. 43-57). Routledge.
Rawls, J. (1951). Outline of a decision procedure for ethics. The Philosophical Review, 60(2), 177-197. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181696
Ricoeur, P. (1994). Oneself as another. En International Philosophical Quarterly, 34(3). The University of Chicago Press.
Sayre-McCord, G. (1996). Coherentist epistemology and moral theory. En W. Sinnott-Armstrong y M. Timmons (Eds.), Moral knowledge? New readings in moral epistemology (pp. 137-189). Oxford University Press.
Schapiro, T. (2014). What are theories of desire theories of? Analytic Philosophy, 55(2), 131-150. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12043
Schoenfield, M. (2016). Moral vagueness is ontic vagueness. Ethics, 126(2), 257-282. https://doi.org/10.1086/683541
Shafer-Landau, R. (2003). Moral realism. A defence. Clarendon Press.
Smith, E. E. y Medin, D. L. (1981). Categories and concepts. Harvard University Press.
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Blackwell.
Star, D. (2011). Oxford studies in normative ethics. Volume 1. En M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford studies in normative ethics. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.001.0001
Strevens, M. (2019). Thinking off your feet. How empirical psychology vindicates armchair philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Timmons, M. (1999). Morality without foundations. A defense of contextualism. Oxford University Press.
Väyrynen, P. (2013). The lewd, the rude and the nasty. A study of thick concepts in ethics. Oxford University Press.
Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C. y Alexander, J. (2010). Are philosophers expert intuiters? Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 331-355. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2010.490944
Wolff, C. (1976). Filosofía primera u ontología. En C. Fernandez (Ed.), Los filósofos modernos I (pp. 381-386). La Editorial Católica.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 Abel de Dios Alarco Grijalva
![Creative Commons License](http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png)
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
THE AUTHORS RETAIN THEIR RIGHTS:
(a) The authors retain their trademark and patent rights, and also on any process or procedure described in the article.
(b) The authors retain the right to share, copy, distribute, execute and publicly communicate the article published in Tesis (Lima) (in example, depositing the article in an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with recognition of its initial publication in the Tesis (Lima).
(c) The authors retain the right to make a later publication of their work, to use the article or any part of it (for example: a compilation of their works, notes for conferences, thesis, or for a book), provided that they indicate the source of publication (authors of the work, magazine, volume, number and date).