Logical pluralism, normativity, and the objectivity of logical knowledge
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15381/tesis.v14i19.21941Keywords:
logical pluralism, normativity, objectivity, anti-exceptionalism, prescriptive practicesAbstract
One of the current debates in the philosophy of logic is between those who defend the special character of logic and the logical anti-exceptionalism’s approach. Appended to this debate is the challenge of establishing an objective logical criterion of correctness beyond the logical system itself. In this paper, the role of normativity and objectivity of logic is analysed in the context of the problem of logical pluralism. It will be examined whether genuine logical facts can be accounted for, to find out how a theory incompatible concerning that logical law should affect our beliefs in such cases and justify some kind of non-factualism about that rule. Non-factualist approaches are discussed and shown to be unsuccessful. Finally, the role of logical normativity and whether it is apprehended through the subsequent acquisition and application of rules will be discussed.
References
Anderson A. R. y Belnap N. D., (1959). A simple treatment of truth functions. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24, 301-302.
Barth, E. M. y Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). From axiom to dialogue. A philosophical study of logics and argumentation. De Gruyter.
Beall, J. C. y Restall, G. (2000). Logical pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78(4), 475-493.
Beall, J. C. y Restall, G. (2006). Logical pluralism. Oxford University Press.
Boghossian, P. A. (2000). Knowledge of logic. En P. Boghossian y C. Peacocke (Eds.), New essays on the a priori (pp. 229-254). Oxford University Press.
Boghossian, P. A. (2014). What is inference? Philosophical Studies, 169, pp. 1-18.
Boghossian, P. A. (2015). Rules, norms and principles: A conceptual framework. En M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, K. Płeszka (Eds.), Problems of normativity, rules and rule-following, 111, 3-13, Springer.
Boghossian, P. y Williamson, T. (2020). Debating the a priori. Oxford University Press.
Burgess, J. (1992). Proofs about proofs: a defense of classical logic. En M. Detlefsen, Proof, logic and normalization (pp. 8-23). Routledge.
Carroll, L. (1895). What the tortoise said to Achilles. Mind, 4(14), 278-280.
Cotnoir, A. J. (2018). Logical nihilism. En Pluralisms in truth and logic (pp. 301-329). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Carnap, R. (1937). The logical syntax of language. Harcourt, Brace and Company. trad. [A. Smeaton, Trad.). (Logische Syntax der Sprache, 1934).
Eklund, M. (2012). The multitude view on logic. En New waves in philosophical logic (pp. 217-240). Palgrave Macmillan.
Field, H. (1996). The A prioricity of logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 359-379.
Field, H. (2000). Apriority as an evaluative notion. En P. Boghossian y C. Peacocke (Eds.), New essays on the a priori (pp. 117-149). Clarendon Press.
Field, H. (2001). Truth and the absence of fact. Oxford University Press.
Field, H. (2009). Epistemology without metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 143, 249-290.
Frege, G. (1979). Posthumous writings. H. Hermes, F. Kambartel y F. Kaulback (Eds.), P. Long y R. White (Trans.). University of Chicago Press.
Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings: A theory of normative judgement. Oxford University Press.
Martínez-Vidal, C. (2000). Is second-order logic logic? En The Logica Yearbook 1999 (pp. 22-36). The Institute of Philosophy. Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.
Martínez-Vidal, C. (2004). The view of logic as model and the objectivity of logic. Reti, Saperi, Linguaggi. Logic, Ontology, and Linguistics / Logica, Ontologia, Linguistica, I, 35-74.
Martínez-Vidal, C. (2005). Is logic objective? Cadernos de Filosofía (Revista do Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem de Lisboa), 18, 7-38.
Priest, G., Berto, F. y Weber, Z. (2018). Dialetheism. En Edward. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/dialetheism/
Quine, W. V. (1936). Truth by convention. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1(1).
Quine, W. V. (1953). From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Mass.
Railton, P. (2000a). A priori rules: Wittgenstein on the normativity of logic. En P. Boghossian y C. Peacocke (Eds.), New essays on the a priori (pp. 170-196). Oxford University Press.
Railton, P. (2000b). Normative force and normative freedom. En J. Dancy (Ed.), Normativity. Ratio Special Issues (pp. 1-33). Wiley-Blackwell.
Russell, G. (2018). Varieties of logical consequence by their resistance to logical nihilism. En Pluralisms in truth and logic (pp. 331-361). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
Von Mises, L. (2008). Human action. A treatise on economics. (4.ª ed.). Ludwig von Mises Institute.
Williamson, T. (2013). Modal logic as metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2014). Logic, metalogic and neutrality. Erkenntnis, 79, 211-231.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Macmillan.
Wittgenstein, L. (1981). Remarks on the foundations of mathematics. (3.ª ed.). Basil Blackwell.
Wright, C. (2004a). Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)? Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 78(1), 167-212.
Wright, C. (2004b). Intuition, entitlement and the epistemology of logical laws. Dialectica, 58, 155-175.
Wright, C. (2001). On basic logical knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 106, 41-85.
Wright, C. (2014). Comments on Paul Boghossian, What is inference? Philosophical Studies, 169, 27-37.
Wyatt, J., Pedersen, N. J. y Kellen, N. (Eds.) (2018). Pluralisms in truth and logic. Palgrave Macmillan.
Yates, S. (2005). What Austrian scholars should know about Logic (and why). Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, 8(3), 53.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2021 María Dolores García-Arnaldos
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
THE AUTHORS RETAIN THEIR RIGHTS:
(a) The authors retain their trademark and patent rights, and also on any process or procedure described in the article.
(b) The authors retain the right to share, copy, distribute, execute and publicly communicate the article published in Tesis (Lima) (in example, depositing the article in an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with recognition of its initial publication in the Tesis (Lima).
(c) The authors retain the right to make a later publication of their work, to use the article or any part of it (for example: a compilation of their works, notes for conferences, thesis, or for a book), provided that they indicate the source of publication (authors of the work, magazine, volume, number and date).
