Ontological Aspects of Functional Contextualism: An Epistemological Assessment

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15381/7tpzxr63

Keywords:

functional contextualism, pragmatism, a-ontological position, realism, antirealism

Abstract

Functional Contextualism (FC) constitutes the philosophy that supports the so-called Contextual Behaviorism within the framework of study of psychology. One of the current controversies refers to its position within the realism/ anti-realism debate, where it assumes an agnostic or a-ontological position,  which qualifies as null and void to answer the question about the existence of an observer-independent reality according to its pragmatist commitment. Its critics argue that this constitutes an anti-realist argument and that it is contradictory to behaviorism in general. The objective will be to present the reasons that justify presenting the a-ontological position as anti-realist and to demonstrate that this does not present a contradiction with a pragmatist conception of contextual behaviorism. The analysis of arguments and interpretation of texts is used as a methodology. The analysis throws up the possibility of an anti-realist position within the CF considering the conceptual use and the behavior of the scientist himself.

References

Barnes-Holmes, D. y Roche, B. (1994). Mechanistic ontology and contextualistic epistemology: A contradiction within behavior analysis. Behavior Analyst, 17, 165-168.

Barnes-Holmes, D. y Roche, B. (1997). A behavior-analytic approach to behavioral reflexivity. The Psychological Record, 47, 543-572

Barnes-Holmes, D. (2000). Behavior pragmatist: no place for reality and truth. The Behavior Analyst, 23(2), 191-202

Barnes-Holmes, D. (2005). Behavioral pragmatist is a-ontological, not antirealist: A reply to Tonneau. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 67-79.

Borge, B. (2015). Conociendo la estructura del mundo. El realismo estructural en el marco del debate realismo vs. antirrealismo científico. Teseopress.

Dewey, J. (2010 [2000]). La miseria de la epistemología. Ensayos de pragmatismo. Biblioteca Nueva.

Dicken, P. (2016). A critical introduction to scientific realism. Bloomsbury.

Diéguez, A. (1998). Realismo científico. Una introducción al debate actual en la filosofía de la ciencia. Universidad de Málaga.

Gifford, E. V. y Hayes, S. C. (1999). Functional contextualism: A pragmatic philosophy for behavioral science. En W. O’Donohue y R. Kitchener (eds.), Handbook of behaviorism (pp. 285-327). Academic Press.

Hayes, S. C. (1998). Understanding and treating the theoretical emaciation of behavior therapy. The Behavior Therapist, 21, 67-68.

Hayes, S. C. (1997). Behavioral epistemology includes non-verbal knowing. En S. C. Hayes (ed.), The act in context. The canonical papers of Steven C. Hayes (pp. 117- 126). Routledge.

Laudan, L. (1981). A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48(1), 19-49.

Mizrahi, M. (2020). The relativity of theory. Key positions and arguments in the contemporary scientific realism/antirealism debate. Springer.

Perdomo, I. y Sánchez, J. (2003). Hacia un nuevo empirismo. Biblioteca Nueva.

Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. Alfred A. Knopf.

Tonneau, F. (2005a). Antirealist arguments in behavior analysis. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 55-65.

Tonneau, F. (2005b). Behavior analysis, common sense and logic: Reply to Barnes-Holmes. Behavior and Philosophy, 33, 81-84.

Van Fraassen, B. C. (1996 [1980]). La imagen científica. Paidós.

Wray, B. K. (2018). Resisting scientific realism. Cambridge University Press.

Downloads

Published

2023-12-29

How to Cite

Ontological Aspects of Functional Contextualism: An Epistemological Assessment. (2023). Tesis (Lima), 16(23), 79-95. https://doi.org/10.15381/7tpzxr63