Peter Fritz, The Foundations of Modality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15381/7b1w6z29Keywords:
modality, propositions, higher-order metaphysics, fineness of grainAbstract
This article is a brief presentation of the main ideas developed in Peter Fritz’s recent book The Foundations of Modality. The main goal of the book is to develop a theory of metaphysical necessity, a notion that has played a crucial role in analytic philosophy in the last decades. This project is carried out via the construction of a theory of propositional individuation, i.e., a theory of the conditions under which two propositions are the same. I start by introducing the debate about the theoretical status of metaphysical necessity. Then, I present Fritz’s central ideas about propositional individuation and the theory of metaphysical necessity he develops based on them.
References
Bacon, A. (2018). The Broadest Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(5), 733– 783.
Bacon, A. (2023). A Theory of Structured Propositions. Philosophical Review, 132(2), 173–238.
Clarke-Doane, J. (2017). Modal Objectivity. Noûs, 53(2), 266–295.
Clarke-Doane, J. (2019). Metaphysical and Absolute Possibility. Synthese, 198(Suppl 8), 1861–
Ditter, A. (2020). The Reduction of Necessity to Essence. Mind, 129(514), 351–380.
Ditter, A. (2022). Essence and Necessity. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 51(3), 653– 690.
Dorr, C. (2014). Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports. In M. García-Carpintero & G. Martí (Eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence (pp. 25–66). Oxford University Press.
Dorr, C. (2016). To Be F is to Be G. Philosophical Perspectives, 30(1), 39–134.
Dorr, C., Hawthorne, J., & Yli-Vakkuri, J. (2021). The Bounds of Possibility: Puzzles of Modal Variation ( J. Hawthorne & J. Yli-Vakkuri, Eds.). Oxford University Press.
Figueroa, F. E. C. (2024). La Metafísica de Orden Superior: El Caso Del Realismo Fregeano. Síntesis Revista de Filosofía, 7(1), 164–183.
Fine, K. (2001). The Question of Realism. Philosophers’ Imprint, 1, 1–30.
Fine, K. (2012). Guide to Ground. In F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality (pp. 37–80). Cambridge University Press.
Fritz, P. (2017). How Fine-Grained is Reality? Filosofisk Supplement, 13(2), 52–57.
Fritz, P. (2020). On Higher-Order Logical Grounds. Analysis, 80(4), 656–666.
Fritz, P. (2021). Ground and Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 105(2), 299–330.
Fritz, P. (2023a). Operands and Instances. Review of Symbolic Logic, 16(1), 188–209.
Fritz, P. (2023b). The Foundations of Modality: From Propositions to Possible Worlds. Oxford University Press.
Fritz, P., & Jones, N. K. (Eds.). (2024). Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
Fritz, P., Lederman, H., & Uzquiano, G. (2021). Closed Structure. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 50(6), 1249–1291.
Goodman, J. (2017). Reality is Not Structured. Analysis, 77(1), 43–53.
Hofweber, T. (n.d.). The Case Against Higher-Order Metaphysics. Metaphysics, 5(1), 29–50.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University
Philosophy Colloquium (D. Byrne & M. Kölbel, Eds.). Harvard University Press.
Mates, B. (1952). Synonymity. In L. Linsky (Ed.), Semantics and the Philosophy of Language (pp. 111–136). University of Illinois Press.
Prior, A. N. (1971). Objects of Thought (P. T. Geach & A. Kenny, Eds.). Clarendon Press.
Rayo, A. (2020). On the Open-Endedness of Logical Space. Philosophers’ Imprint, 20.
Rayo, A., & Yablo, S. (2001). Nominalism Through de-Nominalization. Noûs, 35(1), 74–92.
Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In R. Wasserman, D. Manley, & D. Chalmers (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press. Sider, T. (forthcoming). Higher-Order Metametaphysics. Disputatio.
Skiba, L. (2021). Higher-Order Metaphysics. Philosophy Compass, 16(10), 1–11.
Stalnaker, R. (1999). Context and Content: Essays on Intentionality in Speech and Thought. Oxford University Press UK.
Uzquiano, G. (2015). A Neglected Resolution of Russell?s Paradox of Propositions. Review of Symbolic Logic, 8(2), 328–344.
Walsh, S. (2016). Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church?s Intensional Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 45(3), 277–326.
Williamson, T. (2003). Everything. Philosophical Perspectives, 17(1), 415–465.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
THE AUTHORS RETAIN THEIR RIGHTS:
(a) The authors retain their trademark and patent rights, and also on any process or procedure described in the article.
(b) The authors retain the right to share, copy, distribute, execute and publicly communicate the article published in Tesis (Lima) (in example, depositing the article in an institutional repository or publish it in a book), with recognition of its initial publication in the Tesis (Lima).
(c) The authors retain the right to make a later publication of their work, to use the article or any part of it (for example: a compilation of their works, notes for conferences, thesis, or for a book), provided that they indicate the source of publication (authors of the work, magazine, volume, number and date).
